System bios update & EFI variables are not supported on this system

I accidentally found out that my system bios is completely outdated so I need to update soon …
but during my previous checks efibootmgr -v shows:
EFI variables are not supported on this system.

#inxi -M
Machine:
  Type: Desktop System: Dell product: OptiPlex 7040 v: N/A
    serial: <superuser required>
  Mobo: Dell model: 0HD5W2 v: A00 serial: <superuser required>
    UEFI-[Legacy]: Dell v: 1.11.1 date: 10/10/2018
Product Name: OptiPlex 7040

#fdisk -l
/dev/sda1       2048   1050623   1048576   512M EFI-System

maybe the running system can not access the fat32 EFI or is something wrong?
and
should I expect problems w/ a reboot after the system bios has been updated?

what would you recommend?

further details

#inxi -Fxxxz
System:
  Kernel: 6.4.9-1-MANJARO arch: x86_64 bits: 64 compiler: gcc v: 13.2.1
    clocksource: tsc Desktop: KDE Plasma v: 5.27.7 tk: Qt v: 5.15.10
    info: cairo-dock wm: kwin_x11 vt: 2 dm: SDDM Distro: Manjaro Linux
    base: Arch Linux
Machine:
  Type: Desktop System: Dell product: OptiPlex 7040 v: N/A
    serial: <superuser required> Chassis: type: 3 serial: <superuser required>
  Mobo: Dell model: 0HD5W2 v: A00 serial: <superuser required>
    UEFI-[Legacy]: Dell v: 1.11.1 date: 10/10/2018
CPU:
  Info: quad core model: Intel Core i7-6700 bits: 64 type: MT MCP smt: enabled
    arch: Skylake-S rev: 3 cache: L1: 256 KiB L2: 1024 KiB L3: 8 MiB
  Speed (MHz): avg: 3400 high: 3401 min/max: 800/3400 cores: 1: 3401 2: 3400
    3: 3400 4: 3400 5: 3400 6: 3400 7: 3400 8: 3400 bogomips: 54417
  Flags: avx avx2 ht lm nx pae sse sse2 sse3 sse4_1 sse4_2 ssse3 vmx
Graphics:
  Device-1: Intel HD Graphics 530 vendor: Dell driver: i915 v: kernel
    arch: Gen-9 ports: active: DP-2,HDMI-A-1,HDMI-A-2 empty: DP-1,DP-3,HDMI-A-3
    bus-ID: 00:02.0 chip-ID: 8086:1912 class-ID: 0300
  Display: x11 server: X.Org v: 21.1.8 compositor: kwin_x11 driver: X:
    loaded: intel dri: i965 gpu: i915 display-ID: :0 screens: 1
  Screen-1: 0 s-res: 3840x1848 s-dpi: 96 s-size: 1016x488mm (40.00x19.21")
    s-diag: 1127mm (44.37")
  Monitor-1: DP-2 mapped: DP2 pos: top-center model: Samsung SyncMaster
    serial: <filter> res: 1360x768 hz: 60 dpi: 84 size: 410x230mm (16.14x9.06")
    diag: 470mm (18.5") modes: max: 1360x768 min: 720x400
  Monitor-2: HDMI-A-1 mapped: HDMI1 pos: bottom-r model: Acer K242HL
    serial: <filter> res: 1920x1080 hz: 60 dpi: 92
    size: 530x300mm (20.87x11.81") diag: 609mm (24") modes: max: 1920x1080
    min: 720x400
  Monitor-3: HDMI-A-2 mapped: HDMI2 pos: primary,bottom-l model: Acer K242HL
    serial: <filter> res: 1920x1080 hz: 60 dpi: 92
    size: 530x300mm (20.87x11.81") diag: 609mm (24") modes: max: 1920x1080
    min: 720x400
  API: OpenGL v: 4.6 Mesa 23.1.5 renderer: Mesa Intel HD Graphics 530 (SKL
    GT2) direct-render: Yes
Audio:
  Device-1: Focusrite-Novation Focusrite Scarlett 2i2 driver: snd-usb-audio
    type: USB rev: 2.0 speed: 480 Mb/s lanes: 1 bus-ID: 1-4:3 chip-ID: 1235:8016
    class-ID: fe01
  Device-2: USB MIDI Interface driver: snd-usb-audio type: USB rev: 1.1
    speed: 12 Mb/s lanes: 1 bus-ID: 1-7:5 chip-ID: fc02:0101 class-ID: 0103
  API: ALSA v: k6.4.9-1-MANJARO status: kernel-api with: aoss
    type: oss-emulator
  Server-1: sndiod v: N/A status: off
  Server-2: JACK v: 1.9.22 status: active with: 1: a2jmidid status: active
    2: nsmd status: off
  Server-3: PipeWire v: 0.3.77 status: off with: wireplumber status: off
  Server-4: PulseAudio v: 16.1 status: active with: 1: pulseaudio-alsa
    type: plugin 2: pulseaudio-jack type: module
Network:
  Device-1: Intel Ethernet I219-LM vendor: Dell driver: e1000e v: kernel
    port: N/A bus-ID: 00:1f.6 chip-ID: 8086:15b7 class-ID: 0200
  IF: enp0s31f6 state: up speed: 1000 Mbps duplex: full mac: <filter>
  IF-ID-1: wireguard1 state: unknown speed: N/A duplex: N/A mac: N/A
Drives:
  Local Storage: total: 1.39 TiB used: 242.55 GiB (17.1%)
  ID-1: /dev/sda vendor: SanDisk model: SDSSDH3 500G size: 465.76 GiB
    speed: 6.0 Gb/s tech: SSD serial: <filter> fw-rev: 20RL scheme: GPT
  ID-2: /dev/sdb vendor: Silicon Power model: SPCC Solid State Disk
    size: 953.87 GiB speed: 6.0 Gb/s tech: SSD serial: <filter> fw-rev: 916a
    scheme: GPT
Partition:
  ID-1: / size: 57.37 GiB used: 20.02 GiB (34.9%) fs: ext4 dev: /dev/sda2
  ID-2: /boot size: 511 MiB used: 153.7 MiB (30.1%) fs: vfat dev: /dev/sda1
  ID-3: /home size: 152.74 GiB used: 59.31 GiB (38.8%) fs: ext4
    dev: /dev/sda3
Swap:
  Alert: No swap data was found.
Sensors:
  System Temperatures: cpu: 32.0 C pch: 49.5 C mobo: N/A
  Fan Speeds (rpm): N/A
Info:
  Processes: 270 Uptime: 1h 35m wakeups: 0 Memory: total: 32 GiB
  available: 31.11 GiB used: 3.5 GiB (11.2%) Init: systemd v: 253
  default: graphical Compilers: gcc: 13.2.1 clang: 15.0.7 Packages: pm: pacman
  pkgs: 1513 Shell: Bash v: 5.1.16 running-in: konsole inxi: 3.3.29

better safe than sorry: reboot and enter the actual bios, write down or remember the settings in there, especially if you did changes (disable secure boot i.e.) in the past. it can happen that the bios update will start with default settings that differ from your actual settings.
afterwards you can update your bios.

2 Likes

Please be advised that updating the BIOS or UEFI firmware is only really required if the currently installed version contains serious bugs that affect the performance and/or stability of your system.

Just as an FYI, the UEFI version on my motherboard is about as old as yours. :wink:

The reason why EFI variables are not supported is that your machine boots in legacy BIOS emulation mode, as the inxi snippet tells you.

You do have an EFI partition — which is strange, because if you install the system in legacy BIOS emulation, then it normally won’t create an EFI partition — but I suspect it will be unusable anyway, or at least, if you have a GUID partiton table (GPT), because in that case, the core image of GRUB will have overwritten the partition boundary of the EFI partition, and will have thus damaged anything that was in there.

This is why, when a GPT is used in combination with a legacy BIOS emulation boot, you must normally create an unformatted partition of about 2 MiB, of the type bios_grub. But if you have an MBR/MSDOS-style partition table, then this is not necessary, because MBR/MSDOS leaves enough room in the master boot record for the core.img of GRUB.

No, not normally. But best is to write down the settings of the currently installed one, so you can reapply them after the update, which will come with default settings.

I would recommend not updating the firmware unless you’re having problems with the current one. :wink:

1 Like

yeah it’s weird…
everything works without any problems, all the previous kernel upgrades also ran without any issues. journal or boot sequence do not show any errors.

Basically, I can leave everything as it is … right?

The only question now is whether the system is actually protected by manjaro firmware and kernel or not.

  • “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
  • “Never change a winning team.”

:slight_smile:

Normally, yes. The firmware blobs are loaded into memory at boot and will mitigate the CPU-specific security flaws.

Also, please do keep in mind that anything pertaining to Spectre/Meltdown and the likes has so far never been exploited before in the wild — not on workstations anyway — because those attack vectors all require very convoluted local exploitation techniques. That type of vulnerabilities is mostly of importance for headless rack servers running at data centers. :wink:

2 Likes

Thank you guys!
basically the check looks good - STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE
So I won’t change anything in the system.

Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.46

Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
Kernel is Linux 6.4.9-1-MANJARO #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Wed Aug  9 08:32:12 UTC 2023 x86_64
CPU is Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40GHz

Hardware check
* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
  * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
    * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available:  YES 
    * CPU indicates IBRS capability:  YES  (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
  * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
    * CPU indicates IBPB capability:  YES  (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
  * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
    * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available:  YES 
    * CPU indicates STIBP capability:  YES  (Intel STIBP feature bit)
  * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)
    * CPU indicates SSBD capability:  YES  (Intel SSBD)
  * L1 data cache invalidation
    * CPU indicates L1D flush capability:  YES  (L1D flush feature bit)
  * Microarchitectural Data Sampling
    * VERW instruction is available:  YES  (MD_CLEAR feature bit)
  * Indirect Branch Predictor Controls
    * Indirect Predictor Disable feature is available:  NO 
    * Bottomless RSB Disable feature is available:  NO 
    * BHB-Focused Indirect Predictor Disable feature is available:  NO 
  * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
    * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability:  YES 
    * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability:  NO 
  * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by Meltdown/L1TF (RDCL_NO):  NO 
  * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by Variant 4 (SSB_NO):  NO 
  * CPU/Hypervisor indicates L1D flushing is not necessary on this system:  NO 
  * Hypervisor indicates host CPU might be affected by RSB underflow (RSBA):  YES 
  * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS_NO):  NO 
  * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA_NO):  NO 
  * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by iTLB Multihit (PSCHANGE_MSC_NO):  NO 
  * CPU explicitly indicates having MSR for TSX control (TSX_CTRL_MSR):  NO 
  * CPU explicitly indicates being affected by GDS and having mitigation control (GDS_CTRL):  NO 
  * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by GDS (GDS_NO):  NO 
  * CPU supports Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX):  NO 
  * CPU supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX):  YES 
  * CPU supports Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS):  YES 
  * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems:  NO  (family 0x6 model 0x5e stepping 0x3 ucode 0xf0 cpuid 0x506e3)
  * CPU microcode is the latest known available version:  YES  (latest version is 0xf0 dated 2021/11/12 according to builtin firmwares DB v273+i20230808+b6bd)
* CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants
  * Affected by CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2017-5754 (Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2018-3640 (Variant 3a, rogue system register read):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2018-3639 (Variant 4, speculative store bypass):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2018-3620 (Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2018-3646 (Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2018-12126 (Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2018-12130 (ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2018-12127 (RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2019-11091 (RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2019-11135 (ZombieLoad V2, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA)):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2018-12207 (No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit, machine check exception on page size changes (MCEPSC)):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2020-0543 (Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)):  YES 
  * Affected by CVE-2023-20593 (Zenbleed, cross-process information leak):  NO 
  * Affected by CVE-2022-40982 (Downfall, gather data sampling (GDS)):  NO 
  * Affected by CVE-2023-20569 (Inception, return address security (RAS)):  NO 

CVE-2017-5753 aka 'Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization)
* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec:  NO 
* Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch:  NO 
* Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64):  NO 
* Kernel has array_index_nospec (arm64):  NO 
* Checking count of LFENCE instructions following a jump in kernel...  NO  (only 24 jump-then-lfence instructions found, should be >= 30 (heuristic))
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization)

CVE-2017-5715 aka 'Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: IBRS, IBPB: conditional, STIBP: conditional, RSB filling, PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected)
* Mitigation 1
  * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support:  YES 
    * IBRS enabled and active:  YES 
  * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support:  YES 
    * IBPB enabled and active:  YES 
* Mitigation 2
  * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm):  NO 
  * Kernel compiled with retpoline option:  YES 
  * Kernel supports RSB filling:  YES 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (IBRS + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability)

CVE-2017-5754 aka 'Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: PTI)
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI):  YES 
  * PTI enabled and active:  YES 
  * Reduced performance impact of PTI:  YES  (CPU supports INVPCID, performance impact of PTI will be greatly reduced)
* Running as a Xen PV DomU:  NO 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: PTI)

CVE-2018-3640 aka 'Variant 3a, rogue system register read'
* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability:  YES 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability)

CVE-2018-3639 aka 'Variant 4, speculative store bypass'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl)
* Kernel supports disabling speculative store bypass (SSB):  YES  (found in /proc/self/status)
* SSB mitigation is enabled and active:  YES  (per-thread through prctl)
* SSB mitigation currently active for selected processes:  NO  (no process found using SSB mitigation through prctl)
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl)

CVE-2018-3615 aka 'Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault'
* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability:  YES 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability)

CVE-2018-3620 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT vulnerable)
* Kernel supports PTE inversion:  YES  (found in kernel image)
* PTE inversion enabled and active:  YES 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT vulnerable)

CVE-2018-3646 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault'
* Information from the /sys interface: Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT vulnerable
* This system is a host running a hypervisor:  NO 
* Mitigation 1 (KVM)
  * EPT is disabled:  NO 
* Mitigation 2
  * L1D flush is supported by kernel:  YES  (found flush_l1d in /proc/cpuinfo)
  * L1D flush enabled:  YES  (conditional flushes)
  * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported:  YES  (performance impact of the mitigation will be greatly reduced)
  * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled:  YES 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (this system is not running a hypervisor)

CVE-2018-12126 aka 'Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable)
* Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation:  YES  (md_clear found in /proc/cpuinfo)
* Kernel mitigation is enabled and active:  YES 
* SMT is either mitigated or disabled:  NO 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, and mitigation is enabled)

CVE-2018-12130 aka 'ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable)
* Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation:  YES  (md_clear found in /proc/cpuinfo)
* Kernel mitigation is enabled and active:  YES 
* SMT is either mitigated or disabled:  NO 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, and mitigation is enabled)

CVE-2018-12127 aka 'RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable)
* Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation:  YES  (md_clear found in /proc/cpuinfo)
* Kernel mitigation is enabled and active:  YES 
* SMT is either mitigated or disabled:  NO 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, and mitigation is enabled)

CVE-2019-11091 aka 'RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable)
* Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation:  YES  (md_clear found in /proc/cpuinfo)
* Kernel mitigation is enabled and active:  YES 
* SMT is either mitigated or disabled:  NO 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, and mitigation is enabled)

CVE-2019-11135 aka 'ZombieLoad V2, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA)'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: TSX disabled)
* TAA mitigation is supported by kernel:  YES  (found tsx_async_abort in kernel image)
* TAA mitigation enabled and active:  YES  (Mitigation: TSX disabled)
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: TSX disabled)

CVE-2018-12207 aka 'No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit, machine check exception on page size changes (MCEPSC)'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (KVM: Mitigation: VMX disabled)
* This system is a host running a hypervisor:  NO 
* iTLB Multihit mitigation is supported by kernel:  YES  (found itlb_multihit in kernel image)
* iTLB Multihit mitigation enabled and active:  YES  (KVM: Mitigation: VMX disabled)
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (this system is not running a hypervisor)

CVE-2020-0543 aka 'Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Microcode)
* SRBDS mitigation control is supported by the kernel:  YES  (found SRBDS implementation evidence in kernel image. Your kernel is up to date for SRBDS mitigation)
* SRBDS mitigation control is enabled and active:  YES  (Mitigation: Microcode)
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. Mitigation is enabled)

CVE-2023-20593 aka 'Zenbleed, cross-process information leak'
* Zenbleed mitigation is supported by kernel:  YES  (found zenbleed message in kernel image)
* Zenbleed kernel mitigation enabled and active:  N/A  (CPU is incompatible)
* Zenbleed mitigation is supported by CPU microcode:  NO 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected)

CVE-2022-40982 aka 'Downfall, gather data sampling (GDS)'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Not affected)
* GDS is mitigated by microcode:  NO 
* Kernel supports software mitigation by disabling AVX:  YES  (found gather_data_sampling in kernel image)
* Kernel has disabled AVX as a mitigation:  NO  (AVX support is enabled)
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected)

CVE-2023-20569 aka 'Inception, return address security (RAS)'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Not affected)
* Kernel supports mitigation:  YES  (found spec_rstack_overflow in kernel image)
* Kernel compiled with SRSO support:  YES 
* Kernel compiled with IBPB_ENTRY support:  YES 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected)

> SUMMARY: CVE-2017-5753:OK CVE-2017-5715:OK CVE-2017-5754:OK CVE-2018-3640:OK CVE-2018-3639:OK CVE-2018-3615:OK CVE-2018-3620:OK CVE-2018-3646:OK CVE-2018-12126:OK CVE-2018-12130:OK CVE-2018-12127:OK CVE-2019-11091:OK CVE-2019-11135:OK CVE-2018-12207:OK CVE-2020-0543:OK CVE-2023-20593:OK CVE-2022-40982:OK CVE-2023-20569:OK
1 Like

I started answering and was interrupted and away from pc for a while and than saw everything is already sorted…well i’ll post anyway for the sake of future similar questions and the link:

Maybe efibootmgr cannot read the variables because the EFI is in legacy mode (looking at the inxi). The variables are stored on the chip and not on the disk, so they are not on the ESP partition.

If you are concerned about spectre and co, you can run

sudo spectre-meltdown-checker

to see the current state of things. A lot of stuff is covered at kernel level or the microcode (package intel-ucode)

First see if there is new firmware at all at the site of dell. The current version is at the inxi (better run with sudo)
If there is and you want to see if your system supports linux friendly updating, install gnome-firmware. Otherwise you have to see the infos at dell, maybe there is ISO option. If the only way is windows installer, you can do it with Hirens PE ISO

Note that almost always the efi variables are reset on update!!! That means you will have to turn off secure boot again, maybe adjust the storage settings (just note the current setting or make a photo with your phone of every screen) AND restore the boot menu, because it will probably get deleted and you will not be able to boot manjaro. Here is the manual

That means, before doing anything make a live iso flash drive.

2 Likes

The easiest way for non-Windows users to update BIOS on any modern system is via the flash utility that is built-in to the BIOS itself.

  1. Download update and copy it to a USB stick. THE USB STICK MUST BE FORMATTED AS FAT32.

  2. Reboot, press F12 at splash screen, select “BIOS Flash Update”.

  3. Navigate to your USB stick and select the BIOS you downloaded.

More details and other methods here;

https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000131486/update-the-dell-bios-in-a-linux-or-ubuntu-environment

As others have noted, updating your BIOS usually resets all settings to default values, and default settings will probably have Secure Boot turned on. I strongly suggest making a note of all current BIOS settings before doing the update.

2 Likes

If it exists. While its a pretty basic feature, I am not sure I would even count it among the majority.
For folks without a dedicated partition of windoze, other methods may still be required, such as Hirens Boot CD (now a misnomer because it no longer fits on a cd … but thats just lore).

And because I ran into someone recently who called it rubbish for not having a working internet/browser … protip: download the needed firmware and put it on the removable media alongside Hiren … if using ventoy for example, create a “Data” directory and drop stuff in there next to the ISO’s.

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